Section 35(1) protected these rights by stating "ihe existing [A] boriginal and treaty rights of the [A] boriginal people of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."' The problem with this language was that no one was quite sure what Aboriginal rights were, and therefore what, if anything, was being protected. 9 After the failure to define these rights through four high profile First
Ministers conferences, and a nationally negotiated Charlottetown Accord," 0 The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any [Alboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the [A]boriginal peoples of Canada including (a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and (b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired For judicial interpretation confirming this protection, see R v. Stienhuaer, [1985] 11. The most recent example of the wider view of Aboriginal rights which can emerge from the political process is found in the final report of The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
1-5 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES (1996). This report summarizes and extends many ideas for protecting and improving Aboriginal rights within
The Supreme Court was asked to consider the meaning of Aboriginal rights in the context of criminal charges brought against Aboriginal people under sections of the Fisheries Act and Criminal Code. In the Pamajewon case, charges were laid under the Canadian Criminal Code for keeping a common gaming house and conducting a scheme for the purposes of determining the winners of property. 3 The Canadian Supreme Court held that Aboriginal rights did not include "high stakes gambling" and were not a defense to the convictions entered under the Criminal Code. In the Vanderpeet, Smokehouse and Gladstone cases charges were laid under the Fisheries Act for exchanging fish for money without possessing a commercial fishing license. These cases were more varied in their results.
In Vanderpeet and Smokehouse, the Court held that these particular groups did not have an Aboriginal right to sell and exchange fish, while in Gladstone the Court ruled that the group in question did possess such a right. This latter ruling was significant in Canadian jurisprudence because for the first time the Court held that it is possible for Aboriginal peoples to possess commercial-like rights to harvest and sell resources within their territories. However, these rulings are also important because in arriving at these conclusions the Court seriously undermined the future commercial competitiveness and survival of Aboriginal nations in contemporary Canadian society. This comment will focus on the Court's partiality concerning the contemporary nature of aboriginal rights.
First Nations have an intellectual tradition that teaches about ideas and principles that are partial and incomplete. The elders teach these traditions through a character known as the trickster. 4 He has various persona in different cultures. The Anishinabe (Ojibway) of the Great Lakes call the trickster Nanabush; the First Nations people of the coastal North-west know him as Raven; he is known as Glooscap by the Mi'kmaq of the Maritimes; and as Coyote, Crow, Wisakedjak, Badger, or Old Man among other First Nations people in North America. The trickster offers insights through encounters which are simultaneously altruistic and self-interested. 5 In his adventures the trickster 13 . R.S.C. ch. C-46 (1985) . 14. The trickster's role is revealed in a brief exchange from an interview between Lenore Keeshig-Tobias (an Anishinabe story-teller from my reservation) and Harmut Lutz:
H.L.: Was that your idea, founding the society for the Reawakening of the Trickster?
LKT: The Committee to Re-Establish the Trickster. You know, this is to learn from mistakes. The Trickster, The Teacher is a paradox: Christ-like in a way. Except that from our Teacher, we learn through the Teacher's mistakes as well as the Teacher's virtues.
roams from place to place and fulfills his goals by using ostensibly contradictory behaviors such as charm and cunning, honesty and deception, kindness and mean tricks. 6 The trickster also displays transformative power as he takes on new persona in the manipulation of these behaviors and in the achievement of his objectives.' 7 Lessons are learned as the trickster engages in actions which in some particulars are representative of the listener's behavior, and on other points are uncharacteristic of their comportment." The trickster encourages an awakening of understanding because listeners are compelled to interpret and reconcile the notion that their ideas may be partial. As such, the trickster assists people in conceiving of the limited viewpoint they possess. The trickster is able to kindle these understandings because his actions take place in a perplexing realm that partially escapes the structures of society and the order of cultural things. 9 Thus, this methodology simultaneously frames and centers the judgments as the trickster stands inside and outside of the Court, both as a member and as one of its critics. His appearance provides alternative constitutional interpretations,' and reveals the cultural construction and contingency of law. The trickster's incongruous entry into legal discourse presents law from a perspective which is outside of the conventional structure of legal argument and exposes its hidden cultural (dis)order.
27
Seegwun Seegwun -spring. Nanabush is walking up a stream. Around his ankles the water breaks free and flees to the Nottawasaga River. Imprisoned as ice for too long it hurries its escape towards Georgian Bay and Lake Huron. He notices the water's rush is met by travelers going in the opposite direction. Fish run into and through the water's swollen charge. In the midst of this collision there are 21 . For a series of articles that examines the similarities and differences between jurisprudence and stories, see PETER BROOKS & PAUL GEWIRTZ, LAW'S STORIES (1996). 
See

A New Test For Defining Aboriginal Rights
As the above account reveals, the Canadian Supreme Court developed its definition of Aboriginal rights by using a questionable definition of Aboriginality. However, the Court's initial inquiry was appropriate, as it sought to discover "the purposes behind section 35(1) as they relate to the scope of the rights the provision is intended to protect." 4 The Court properly found that the "special legal and constitutional status of 48. It is ironic that this assertion of British sovereignty should form one of the principal bases and underlying purposes for the existence of Aboriginal rights. At its most simple level, one might have thought that the assertion of British sovereignty was the last thing that would inform the constitutionalized protection of Aboriginal rights, since it is almost always British sovereignty that most severely threatens these rights. 
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stake. This factor for defining Aboriginal rights was first spoken of in the pathbreaking case of R. v. Sparrowe and was elaborated upon in Vanderpeet. While the Sparrow Court observed that the Aboriginal perspective on their rights was crucial, in Vanderpeet they modified this approach and stated that the Aboriginal perspective must be "framed in terms cognizable to the Canadian legal and constitutional structure," 5 to incorporate both Aboriginal and nonAboriginal legal perspectives. This reformulation substantially weakened the potential for Aboriginal claimants to express the law on their own terms, according to their own customs. To facilitate an understanding among Canadian judges, Aboriginal laws will need refraining and reinterpretation. This creates the very real danger of mischaracterizing Aboriginal law in order to make it "fit" another system, and thus not accurately protect the underlying context and reason fcr the rule's existence within the Aboriginal community.' Curiously, the Court reasoned that this approach best reconciles the prior occupation of Canada with Crown sovereignty because it bridges two legal perspectives The second factor the Court identified in determining integral Aboriginal practices concerns the nature of the claim being made. The Court narrowed the nature of claim being put forward, as it often does when considering collective rights. ' The Chief Justice wrote that to define integral Aboriginal rights one must identify the precise nature of the claim to determine whether the evidence provided supports its recognition. The correct characterization of a claim involved three considerations: "the nature of the action which the applicant [was] claiming was done pursuant to an [A]boriginal right, the nature of the governmental regulation, statute or action being impugned, and the tradition, custom or practice being relied upon to establish the right."
6 ' The application of these steps in determining the precise nature of the claim asserted was a very significant activity in all four cases. The Court's characterization of the claim in some instances changed the very question the people were attempting to litigate 2 For example, in Pamajewon it would not be an unfair reading of the case to observe that the appellants were asserting a right to self-government. However, since rights to Indian self-government have not yet been explicitly recognized in Canadian jurisprudence, the Supreme Court considered that assertions of Aboriginal rights to self-government were cast at a level of "excessive generality.' ' M The court observed that if section 35(1) rights encompass claims to self-government, which it did not decide, one must consider these claims in the light of specific practices integral to the pre-contact Aboriginal culture. The Court's re-characterization of the right illustrated its unwillingness to consider self-government rights on any general basis.
This approach defeats many Aboriginal peoples' aspirations for a fuller articulation of powers relative to the federal and provincial governments.O It is clear that the current Court was unwilling to consider Aboriginal rights to self-government on any global basis. Thus, in the Pamajewon case, tfie precise nature of the right was characterized as a right to "participate in, and to regulate, high stakes gambling activities on the reservation." ' The Court rejected this claim as an Aboriginal right and refused to consider it on a broader basis.
Similarly, in the Vanderpeet and Smokehouse cases, the Court also narrowed the consideration of the claimed practice to a more precise articulation of the potential right. These two cases held that the most accurate characterization of the Aboriginal position consisted of a right "to exchange fish for money or other goods." ' 67 Since the evidence in these cases did not support this more limited right, it was not necessary to consider the nature of this right at a more general level. However, in the Gladstone case, compelling evidence existed that the sale and exchange of fish was integral to the Nation's culture, and thus the court looked even further to determine whether there was an associated Aboriginal right to trade on a commercial basis. It found that such a right existed, which was a significant finding because it confirmed that Aboriginal peoples can possess constitutionally-protected commercial rights. By holding that an Aboriginal right could exist at this level of generality, the Court held out a thin thread of hope for Aboriginal peoples seeking more encompassing rights. The Gladstone case demonstrated that precise rights to a practice may also evidence more general rights. This step by step approach to defining Aboriginal rights underlines the Court's hesitancy to articulate them more broadly.
The third factor the court considered in the application of the integral to a distinctive culture test concerned the centrality of the practice to the group claiming the right. The majority wrote that "the claimant must demonstrate that the practice, tradition or custom was a central and significant part of the society's distinctive culture. ' M As noted previously, to have a practice protected as a right the group must show that the activity was distinctive -a defining feature of the culture. "A practical way of thinking about this problem 
7 This raises an additional question about why, in Vanderpeet, notions of survival and the contemporary exercise of rights did not form part of the integral to a distinctive culture test, since the idea of "integral" in Sparrow included the contemporary exercise of rights necessary for physical and cultural survival. Aboriginal rights should exist to ensure Indigenous peoples' physical and cultural survival, not necessarily to preserve distinctive elements of pre-contact culture. The acceptance of these considerations would have strengthened Aboriginal peoples interactions with other Canadians, and been more consistent with the Court's previous rulings.
The fourth factor the Court articulated in determining whether an Aboriginal practice is integral to a distinctive culture was whether they had continuity with the activities which existed "prior to the arrival of the Europeans in North America." 
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Aboriginal peoples possess as an integral right was their organization in societies according to their traditions, customs and laws.' The organization and laws of Aboriginal peoples were universally protected as something each group could successfully claim, though it was true their content varied from group to group. A seventh factor to consider in applying the integral test was that the claimed practice contain independent significance to the community, and not be a mere incidence to another tradition. Without providing justification or reasons the court wrote that "[i]ncidental practices, customs and traditions cannot qualify as [A]boriginal rights through a process of piggybacking on integral practices, customs and traditions." ' This assertion seems contrary to the Court's earlier ruling in R. v. Simon, where incidental practices were protected as Aboriginal rights.' It also suggests that, while the Court was willing to protect independent rights in the abstract, it was unwilling to preserve the place and means necessary to make the exercise of rights meaningful. Only the future will reveal if and how the Court will resolve this seeming contradiction.
The other three factors the Court identified as important in determining Aboriginal rights involved the "distinctive" nature of the Aboriginal practice." A distinctive practice is one that does not arise solely as a response to European influences," and which can arise separately from the Aboriginal group's relationship to the land." Distinctiveness and the European influence on Aboriginal rights have been touched upon elsewhere in this comment and will receive no further attention at this point. However, the idea that Aboriginal rights may arise not only from prior occupation of land, but from the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of Aboriginal people is novel. Prior to these cases it was not clear whether Aboriginal rights arose only through claims to Aboriginal title.' Now it is clear that Aboriginal title does not necessarily need the requisite proof to sustain other Aboriginal rights. Section 35(1) of the Constitution is emerging as the most relevant criteria in defining Aboriginal rights in Canada. The subsequent Supreme Court cases of Adams and Cote followed this approach, wherein it was held that Aboriginal peoples 631, 645-6 (1996) The net effect of these ten considerations is to circumscribe Aboriginal rights and bring them more fully under the cultural assumptions of the common law. They establish non-Aboriginal characterizations of Aboriginality," evidencen and law 3 as the standards against which Aboriginal rights are measured. Taken together, these factors compel the conformity of Aboriginal rights to "western" formulalions of law in order to find recognition and affirmation in Canada's constitulion. This creates problems for Aboriginal groups since these norms are generally not sensitive to the Aboriginal perspective on the meaning of the rights at stake 4 and consequently constrain the reception of Aboriginal viewpoints. Yet, the Court should not interpret these rights in such an inflexible and narrow manner0s The trickster conveys this principle.
Tahwahgi
Tahwahgi -Fall. The Couchiching Narrows, Orillia, Ontario. Nanabush has recently presided over the opening of the casino on the Chippewas of the Rama reservation. Confined for over a century, Anishinabe self-government has escaped federalism's cells and now spills into the surrounding communities. Over one-hundred thousand people travel to Rama and drop quarters in the Casino's well. The Woodland art of its outer walls encloses the interaction of mean tricks and kindness, help and neglect, charm and cunning. The rush to get into self-government's outward flow has its periods of rest too. Nanabush takes the three minute walk to the Lake. On the water the boat's sails hang loosely. For 4000 years an Aboriginal weir raked these Narrows to trap fish behind its wooden bars. Now behind the Lake's shores the fingers of a new presence reach out. Nanabush looks back towards it; thinks about how he placed it [Vol. 22
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/2 perfectly. Buses disgorge their contents, cars and trains arrive every few minutes, the people of the reserve are also swept into its flow; its grasp is extensive.
North of Rama, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer presides over the fate of two casinos on the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake reservations. It is the Pamajewon case. The communities have risked asking the Court to rule that Aboriginal rights to self-government include high-stakes gambling. The outward rush into these communities is just beginning to build. The land is cleared for a new gaming hall and hotel, and signs on the highway announce the arrival of monster bingo. The Chief Justice takes a thirty-two paragraph stroll around the place. With Vanderpeet as a companion -a "legal standard against which the appellants' claim must be measured" ' 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997 this case it can be seen that the correct characterization of the appellants' claim [is] that they [are] claiming the right to participate in, and to regulate, high stakes gambling activities on the reservation"."° His short promenade sidesteps claims about Aboriginal rights to self-government. "The appellants themselves would have this Court characterize their claim as to 'a broad right to manage the use of their reserve lands.' To so characterize the appellants' claim would be to cast the Court's inquiry at a level of excessive generality.''. This is a comfortable pace. One needs to get a little exercise, but no use over-extending yourself. "The factors laid out in Vanderpeet, and applied, supra, allow the Court to consider the appellants' claim at the appropriate level of specificity; the characterization put forward by the appellants would not allow the Court to do so.""la It is too high a level of generality to think that Aboriginal people would actually have a broad right to manage the use of their own lands.
The Chief Justice is almost through with his visit. It is getting dark. He just has something to dispose of before he leaves -whether Shawanaga and Eagle Lake's "participation in, and regulation of, gambling on reserve lands was an integral part of their distinctive culture.""un The evidence "d[oes] not demonstrate that gambling, or that the regulation of gambling, was of central significance to the Ojibway people." Prior to contact, informal gambling activities took place on a "small scale." The Chief Justice refers to a prior visitor: "I also agree with the observation made by Flaherty Prov. Ct. J... commercial lotteries such as bingo [were] a twentieth century phenomena and nothing of the kind existed amongst [A]boriginal peoples and was never part of the mtns by which these societies were traditionally sustained or socialized.""' Done. End of the trail. The claim is defeated since Anishinabe gambling, prior to contact, was not done on a twentieth century scale. Hardly surprising that this standard of evidence could not be met. Not many activities in any society, prior to this century, took place on a twentieth-century scale. It is a good thing the rights of other Canadians do not depend on whether such rights were important to them two to three hundred years ago. What would it be like for Canadians to have their fundamental rights defined by what was integral to European people's distinctive culture prior to their arrival in North America?"
The door slams. The Chief Justice drives away. Self-government will serve more time in isolation, locked within federalism's cells. Very few people will [Vol. 22
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/2 visit Shawanaga and Eagle Lake, even fewer will leave their money behind. The people of Shawanaga and Eagle Lake will not spend the rest of their lives, and that of their children's children, caught inside a casino." The fresh October wind is brisk. Clear. Orange and yellow leaves dance in this breeze, and mimic the setting autumn sun. A walk to shore reveals Indian fishers pulling in their nets. Whitefish and trout will be served tonight. Lake Huron has witnessed this activity for centuries. No buses, trains or cars crowding the life out of the community. No new presence -no grasping; quiet settles back into the familiar rhythms of activity.
An Alternative Basis for the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal Rights
As the preceding account reveals, the idea that Aboriginal peoples will have to base the source and temporal roots of their rights in their historic presencetheir ancestry -in North America and reconcile these with Crown sovereignty is disputed. The downgrading of Aboriginal rights is even more apparent in the greater power given to Canadian governments to infringe Aboriginal rights in these cases. In Gladstone, the majority provided strong obiter dicta stating that Aboriginal rights must be capable of being limited and, as such, could be infringed by justifiable government legislation." This potentially widens the government's power to interfere with Aboriginal rights. Justifiable legislative objectives could include "the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and the recognition of the historic reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by non-[A]boriginal groups."" This further potential for the infringement of Aboriginal rights must be considered in the light of the fact that government already has a generous two-step chance for justifying interference with Aboriginal rights outlined in Sparrow.'" The concern that motivated the 125 widening of permissible legislative infringement in Gladstone was the lack of any inherent limitation for Aboriginal people on the exercise of their rights. This concern is curious, from an Aboriginal perspective, because there are limitations placed on these rights -the laws and traditions of Aboriginal peoples. ' Aboriginal peoples have laws which dictate the appropriate exercise of a right.' 32 Furthermore, non-Aboriginal peoples exercise exclusive rights all the time. In fact, exclusive rights are one of the distinguishing features of western legal systems. Why should an extra concern arise when Aboriginal peoples exercise exclusive rights? What can explain the concern in assigning Aboriginal peoples exclusive rights, when the Court generally shows no anxiety when allotting them to non-Aboriginal peoples?
The Chief Justice's failure to place equal weight on Aboriginal practices, customs and traditions contradicts his stated purpose for the inclusion of section 35 (1) 
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Constitution." 3 Once again, the trickster's engagement with the court can help identify whether the Court has upheld such a purpose.
Peebon
Peebon -Winter. Frozen rights. Peebon's return always brings hardship, decay and dissolution. His perpetual defeat of Neebin withers the plants, hardens the ground and sends white beings through the skies. With his approach the animals sleep, and fish return to deep lakes escaping the rivers' congealing arteries. To the north, the ancient grandfathers retreat to their lodges. Their fires reflect on the sky -blue, white and cold red, and illuminate the path of souls for those traveling to the land of the dead. Some time will pass before the grandfather's voices again accompany the clouds and let their fire fall across the earth. For now, they remain in their lodges, protect their fires, and await the return of Neebin. Peebon and Neebin's perpetual quest for supremacy continually enforces this cycle on the Anishinabe. While Peebon is in the ascendancy, Nanabush looks for ways to steal fire from the grandfathers, to bring it back to the Anishinabe and keep them warm.
Peebon's frigid sovereignty has wide dominion. Aboriginal practices that developed solely as a response to European culture are now frozen, courtesy of the "integral test." How can one reconcile this with Chief Justice Antonio Lamer's own observation that Aboriginal rights developed from the "peculiar meeting of two vastly different legal cultures."
3 Nanabush stalks the land and looks for ways to steal fire. He approaches the common law warily. He might get burn,. With suspicion that comes from experience, he knows the danger of trying to take something of value from that which can harm him so greatly. Yet he is both brave and foolish, so he tries.
Nanabush [Vol. 22
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/2 While the Court asserted that Aboriginal rights are based on traditional laws and customs "passed down, and arising from, the pre-existing culture and customs of [A]boriginal peoples,"'' nowhere in these cases does the Chief Justice use the laws of the people charged, or the laws of any other Aboriginal people, to arrive at the standards through which he will define these rights.' As such, the Court does not use "intersocietal" law in developing its test for Aboriginal rights." In so observing Nanabush has peered into the fire and found a branch sufficiently dense in its grain to keep a flame burning while he brings it back home to his people.
Nanabush reaches in through the smoke and observes that the Chief Justice engaged in an abstract, theoretical approach to define Aboriginal rights. He did not fully reference the "long-standing practices linking the various communities" in defining Aboriginal rights."" Vacuous reasons about section 35(1) reconciling Crown assertions of sovereignty with the fact that Aboriginal peoples were here first, may at the most elementary level qualify as an application of intersocietal law. However, the idea that this reconciliation should take place upon contact finds no support in either Aboriginal or nonAboriginal law. It is the Chief Justice's invention. Nanabush has firmly grasped the branch and taken it from the fire. The smoke is clearing. Nanabush 
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held that the "moment of European contact" was the "definitive" time for establishing an Aboriginal right. It is now time for Nanabush to run for home. The fires of his people are almost extinguished. What he has found may re-kindle them. The common law's recognition of Aboriginal ancestral laws and customs, and their continual evolution and interaction with the Crown, is preferred as a basis for defining Aboriginal rights because it is more in line with the existing case law and the "time honoured methodology of the common law."" 4 This methodology follows a "golden thread" of case law which defines the nature and incidents of Aboriginal rights by reference to the laws and customs of Indigenous people. 45 This methodology also fans the embers of Aboriginal law and encourages its development as a greater source of authority for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians."~ With this basis for defining Aboriginal rights, the purpose of section 35(1) becomes truly "intersocietal." It also strengthens the continued interaction of these laws because Constitutional protection of the existing customary laws and rights of Aboriginal peoples ensures that such customs and rights' remain in the Aboriginal people until extinguished or surrendered by treaty. Since Aboriginal rights rest on Aboriginal laws, section 35(1) must define these rights by reference to these pre-existing laws.
While Nanabush steals fire, Peebon's chilling pervasiveness is felt all around. Nanabush's solitary actions may not be enough to help the thaw. The Supreme Court of Canada's interpretations of Aboriginal rights remain restrictive and burdensome. The integral to a distinctive culture test freezes the protection of practices which may have developed solely as response to European cultures. Yet the adoption of new practices, traditions and laws in response to new influences is always integral to the survival of any community in its relations with another. Reconciliation should not require Aboriginal peoples to concede those practices which allow them to survive as a contemporary community. However, the Court's new test threatens Aboriginal cultures precisely on this point, since in adapting to new situations they do not have protection for the practices devised in meeting challenges solely as a result of European influence. 47 Such a restriction is contrary to the Chief Justice's assertion that "equal weight" be placed on Aboriginal law t4 by 
Conclusion
This comment has attempted to show how Aboriginal rights in Canada's Constitution remain partial and incomplete. The Court's integral to a distinctive culture test does not extend protection to aboriginal practices that developed solely as a result of European influence -even if those practices are crucial to their contemporary physical and cultural survival. Surely this result is less than a full recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights. Aboriginal peoples are entitled to expect legal protection for their existence as communities and nations within North America. Otherwise, what is the value of entrenching aboriginal rights in the Constitution if the societies these rights were meant to protect cannot survive? Canadian courts have not yet come to terms with the fact that, like others, Aboriginal people are traditional, modem and post-modem. Physical and cultural survival depends as much on attracting legal protection for contemporary activities, as it does on gaining recognition for traditional practices. The courts need to recognize that aboriginal rights attach to Aboriginal activities, whether making moccasins or marketing computers. It is not specific practices that are necessarily important to the definition of Aboriginal rights; what counts in determining Aboriginal rights is whether these practices contribute to the survival of the group. The rights exist first and foremost to protect the group, and are only incidentally concerned with the protection of specific practices. However, the courts are operating under the assumption that protecting specific " [A] boriginal" activities satisfies the Constitutional purpose for the entrenchment of Aboriginal rights (and they get to decide what is Aboriginal). They do not interpret aboriginal in a "large, liberal and generous manner," with "sensitivity to the [A]boriginal perspective on the meaning of the rights at stake."'' Thus, they interpret
